Security of Post-selection based Continuous Variable Quantum Key
  Distribution against Arbitrary Attacks by Walk, Nathan et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
10
6.
08
25
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  4
 Ju
n 2
01
1
Security of Post-selection based Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution
against Arbitrary Attacks
Nathan Walk∗ and Timothy C. Ralph
Centre for Quantum Computation and Communication Technology
School of Mathematics and Physics, University of Queensland, St Lucia, Queensland 4072, Australia
Thomas Symul and Ping Koy Lam
Centre for Quantum Computation and Communication Technology
Department of Physics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, ACT 0200, Australia
(Dated: October 2, 2018)
We extend the security proof for continuous variable quantum key distribution protocols using
post selection to account for arbitrary eavesdropping attacks by employing the concept of an equiv-
alent protocol where the post-selection is implemented as a projective quantum measurement. We
demonstrate that the security can be calculated using only experimentally accessible quantities and
finally explicitly evaluate the performance for the case of a noisy Gaussian channel in the limit of
unbounded key length.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the process of gen-
erating a common random key between two parties using
a quantum communications protocol. The power of this
method is that the security of the key distribution, and
the subsequent communication via a one time pad, is es-
tablished while making no assumptions about the tech-
nological capabilities of a eavesdropper. This procedure
also has the distinction of being the most developed [1]
quantum information technology.
There are two main flavours of QKD, discrete variable
(DV) and continuous variable (CV) which are realised by
encoding and then detecting single photons [2] and the
quadrature variables [3] of the optical field respectively.
The latter kind, which we shall consider here, has the ad-
vantage of higher raw bit rates due to the high efficiency
and high bandwidth of homodyne detection and ease of
integration with existing communications infrastructure.
CV protocols that employ post-selection [4] - a classical
filtering of the measurement results - enjoy additional
advantages in terms of versatility and reconciliation effi-
ciency.
Asymptotic (in the sense of string length) uncondi-
tional security for protocols that do not employ post-
selection is achieved by first noting the equivalence of
an experimentally implemented prepare and measure
(P&M) scheme to an entanglement based (EB) version
[5], followed by the result that for collective attacks se-
curity may be bounded from below by assuming the en-
tangled state at the end of the protocol is Gaussian [6]
and finally a proof that that collective attacks are asymp-
totically optimal [7]. However for protocols using post-
selection (PS) this analysis cannot be straightforwardly
applied as an equivalent entanglement based picture has
yet to be constructed, with security only shown under
the assumption of a Gaussian eavesdropping attack [8].
By filling in this gap we are able to provide a security
proof for coherent state post-selection protocols.
Security of CVQKD.—In general one equates each pro-
tocol in which: the sender (Alice) prepares an ensemble
of quantum states based upon a classical random prob-
ability distribution and sends it through the domain of
the eavesdropper (Eve) to the recipient (Bob), to an en-
tanglement based scheme in which: Alice prepares an
entangled state one half of which is kept and used for
a projective measurement; and the other is transmitted
to Bob again through Eves domain. The proper choice
of the initial entangled state and the projective measure-
ment by Alice allows us to rigorously express any prepare
and measure scheme [5]. Bob makes a quadrature mea-
surement upon his received states and then Alice and
Bob engage in a reconciliation procedure to correct the
errors in their shared classical string. The secret key rate
for the entire protocol is then given by
K = βI(a : b)− I(E : X), X ∈ {A,B} (1)
where I(a : b) is the Shannon mutual information be-
tween classical strings belonging to Alice and Bob at the
end of the protocol, β is the efficiency of their recon-
ciliation procedure and I(E : X) is the quantum mu-
tual information between either Eve and Bob if consid-
ering reverse reconciliation protocols or Eve and Alice if
considering direct reconciliation. Although employing a
Gaussian encoding would in principle be optimal for Al-
ice and Bob, in practice the reconciliation efficiency of
such a scheme scales poorly with loss. An alternative
is to use a simpler sign encoding for which the mutual
information is
I(A : B) = 1 + pe log2(pe) + (1 − pe) log2(1− pe) (2)
where pe is the probability of Bob measuring a positive
value given a negative encoding and vice versa.
Eve’s mutual information is given by the difference be-
tween von Neumann entropies of the entangled state be-
fore and after Alice or Bob’s measurement. The direct
reconciliation expression is GarciaPatron:2006p381
I(E : A) = S(E)− S(E|a) = S(AB)− S(B|a) (3)
2with the von Neumann entropy given by S(ρ) =
tr(ρ log ρ) and for the second equality we have used the
fact that overall tripartite state |ABE〉 is pure. This
quantity is not easy to calculate in general but it has
been shown [6] that we may bound the expression from
below by analysing a Gaussian state with the same first
and second moments. For Gaussian states, the von Neu-
mann entropy is obtained straightforwardly and thus the
security of the entire protocol can be characterised en-
tirely by the covariance matrix of the entangled state
shared by Alice and Bob.
Equivalent post-selection scheme.—While reverse rec-
onciliation can be shown to to be secure for large losses
direct reconciliation is only successful when the channel
loss is below 50% or 3dB. This can be remedied using
post-selection [4], a technique in which a region is iden-
tified in the space of Bob’s possible quadrature measure-
ment results and Alice’s quadrature encoding and only
instances within the region are kept to form the key. This
improved performance comes at the price of not being
able to directly apply Eq.3 as this would not allow for
Eve’s knowledge of Alice and Bob’s post-selection. This
can be accounted for as long as one can keep track of
the way post-selection by one party influences the state
of the other in the equivalent EB scheme which we shall
now demonstrate.
FIG. 1: Prepare and measure and entanglement based ver-
sions of a post-selected protocol. In the P&M scheme a),
Alice sends a ensemble of coherent states through Eve’s do-
main to Bob who heterodyne detects and applies classical
post-processing. Equivalently, b), Alice and Bob pass their
respective arms of a distributed EPR pair through devices
that project into quadrature regions corresponding to data
kept in a). Security is calculated for an equivalent all Gaus-
sian scheme, c), that has the same output statistics from het-
erodyne measurement, providing a lower bound on the secret
key rate.
For the sake of concreteness we shall consider a partic-
ular P&M scheme, Fig.1 panel a), in which Alice draws
values (xA, pA) from a bivariate Gaussian of 0 mean and
variance VA and uses these numbers to modulate the
vacuum to create an ensemble of coherent states of the
form |x¯+ ip¯〉 which she sends to Bob through a quantum
channel. Bob uses heterodyne detection on his received
states, measuring quadratures given by xˆ = aˆ + aˆ† and
pˆ = i(aˆ†− aˆ) where we have normalised the vacuum noise
to unity. Alice then filters her results such that she only
keeps values whose magnitude lies between upper UA and
lower LA thresholds, i.e. LA ≤ |xA|, |pA| ≤ UA and Bob
similarly post-selects his measurement results such that
LB ≤ |xA|, |pA| ≤ UB. Finally Alice and Bob publicly
announce a subset of their data to characterise the chan-
nel and, if secure, engage in reconciliation and privacy
amplification to distill a completely secure key. This is
very similar to the situation that was implemented in
[9, 10] except for the fact that aside from channel charac-
terisation, neither Alice or Bob announce anything about
their measurements or encoding on a shot by shot basis
and Bob employs heterodyne detection .
The equivalent entanglement based scheme, Fig.1
panel b), involves Alice preparing a two-mode squeezed
vacuum or EPR state, one mode of which she keeps and
measures, the other is transmitted to Bob over a quantum
channel. At the measurement step Alice and Bob first
split up their modes on a balanced beamsplitter intro-
ducing a unit of vacuum noise. We implement the post-
selection as a device that non-deterministically performs
one of the projective measurements
∫ −L
−U dx |x〉 〈x| +∫ L
U dx |x〉 〈x| or
∫ −L
−U dp |p〉 〈p|+
∫ L
U dp |p〉 〈p|. If the mea-
surement fails the attempt is abandoned. If it succeeds
the state is retained and subsequently measured.
Finally we bound the keyrate from below by evaluating
the security of the third protocol, Fig.1 panel c), which
has exactly the same first and second moments as the pre-
vious entangled scheme but is entirely Gaussian, allowing
for the exact calculation of entropies while maximising
Eve’s information. The squeezers are present to reflect
the fact that Alice’s post-selected classical distribution in
the P&M scheme can have variance less than shot noise,
thus the corresponding Gaussian protocol must have the
potential to be squeezed on both arms after the beam-
splitter.
Crucially both the variances and the correlations mea-
sured in the Gaussian EB scheme correspond exactly to
measurable quantities in the P&M version. Having ob-
tained these quantities , namely Alice and Bob each mea-
suring xˆ and pˆ, we wish to infer back through the op-
erations at their stations to completely characterise the
two-mode state shared by Alice and Bob directly after
transmission and hence quantify Eve’s information. Bob
and Alice’s operations are just beamsplitters and single
mode-squeezers so this can be straightforwardly achieved
at the level of the covariance matrix using appropriate
3symplectic transformations. Note that Eve’s informa-
tion evaluated with respect to the four mode state just
prior to measurement will be exactly the same as that
of the two mode state as the evolution between the two
points involves only pure states and unitary operations.
The covariance matrices before and after Alice and Bob’s
beamsplitters are related by,
γf = S
T (r)BST (TB)BS
T (TA) γiBS (TA)BS (TB)S(r)
where
S(r) =
[
e−r 0
0 er
]
, BS(T ) =
[ √
T I2
√
1− T I2
−√1− T I2
√
T I2
]
are the symplectic transformations for a one-mode
squeezer and a two-mode beamsplitter respectively. Us-
ing our knowledge of Alice and Bob’s station, namely
that TA = TB =
1
2
and that in γi the ancillae are un-
correlated vacua we can deduce an equivalent 2-mode
covariance matrix in the standard form of an EPR with
one arm distributed though a Gaussian channel,
γAB =
[
1 + Vα I2
√
η(V 2α + 2Vα) σz√
η(V 2α + 2Vα) σz ηVα + ηδ + 1 I2
]
(4)
where the parameters η,δ and Vα characterise an effective
Gaussian ensemble sent though a Gaussian channel. The
crucial tradeoff in this scheme is between a large post-
selection to improve the effective channel parameters and
the probability of obtaining measurement results within
the post-selection region. Note that in order to safely
assume that the covariance matrix is of the symmetric
form, Eq.4, Alice and Bob will need to make use of an
active symmetrisation step as outlined in [11].
In particular although the post-selection is symmetric
about the chosen quadratures in phase space it is not gen-
erally rotationally symmetric. In [11] the authors solve
this issue which similarly effects discretely modulated
protocols by having Alice and Bob implement a series
of randomly chosen orthogonal transformations on their
classical data. This is equivalent to performing random
conjugate transformations in the EB scheme and allows
Alice and Bob to essentially enforce the symmetry they
want. In the P&M version of our protocol these trans-
formations are performed after measurement but before
the post-selection. This means that although Eve is as-
sumed to know the absolute values of the post-selection
threshold she does not know the direction in phase space
upon which they will be enforced, preventing her from
gaining an advantage through symmetry breaking.
In general the result of the post-selection is to produce
a much larger initial EPR state that has gone through
better effective channel. This occurs becuase we are post-
selecting on the data for which Alice and Bob are more
correlated. Due to the non-deterministic nature of the
protocol the information that could be extracted from the
whole ensemble is sharply decreased but the information
advantage on the post-selected key is higher.
Gaussian channel.— Having established a method of
evaluating security under general eavesdropper attacks
it remains to see what kind of performance this method
results in for the most common case, the noisy Gaussian
channel. Such a channel is completely parameterised by
it’s transmission T and excess thermal noise ξ. In this
case there is a class of collective eavesdropper attacks
known to be equivalent and optimal and we are free to
choose a specific form to facilitate calculation [12]. We
choose the entangling cloner attack where we assume Eve
replaces the lossy channel with a perfect channel and a
beamsplitter of transmission T on which she mixes Al-
ice’s incoming signal with one arm of her own EPR pair.
Both EPR states are generated by combining finitely xˆ
and pˆ-squeezed states on balanced beamsplitters. The
squeezing of Eve’s state is determined by the chan-
nel according to VE = exp
(
cosh−1(1− T + ξ)/(1− T ))
while the squeezing of Alice’s EPR is fixed by the vari-
ance of her classical distribution according to VS =
exp
(
cosh−1(VA + 1)
)
. We now evolve the 6-mode (4
EPR arms and 2 vacuum ancillae) system through chan-
nel, beamsplitters and post-selection to obtain that state
just before the homodyne detectors,
|ABE〉 =
∫
dxi ψ(xi)
∣∣∣∣x1 − x22 + x3√2
〉
A
∣∣∣∣x1 − x22 − x3√2
〉
A
∣∣∣∣∣
√
T
2
(x4 + x5) +
√
1− T
2
(x1 + x2)
〉
E
∣∣∣∣x4 − x5√2
〉
E∣∣∣∣∣
√
T
2
(x1 + x2)−
√
1− T
2
(x4 + x5) +
x6√
2
〉
B
∣∣∣∣∣
√
T
2
(x1 + x2)−
√
1− T
2
(x4 + x5)− x6√
2
〉
B
, i = 1...6 (5)
where
ψ(xi) =
1
(2pi)3/2
e
(
−
x
2
1
4VS
−
x
2
2
VS
4
−
x
2
3
4
−
x
2
4
4VE
−
x
2
5
VE
4
−
x
2
6
4
)
(6)
and the subscripts on the kets indicate ownership. The
post-selection involves taking definite integrals over Alice
and Bob’s modes and the covariance matrix elements cor-
4responding to the measured quadratures are calculated
according to γij =
1
2
〈{xˆixˆj}〉 − 〈xˆi〉 〈xˆj〉 over |ABE〉.
Having calculated these quantities we calculate security
for the symmetric Gaussian state with the same covari-
ance matrix as outlined above. The final step is to mul-
tiply this keyrate by the probability of the post-selection
succeeding, which in the EB scheme is simply the norm
of the post-selected state.
FIG. 2: Secret key rates for direct reconciliation combined
with post-selection as a function of transmission for increas-
ing levels of excess noise (ξ = 0, ξ = 0.01, ξ = 0.05) with
decreasing keyrate.
Results for keyrate as a function of channel transmis-
sion are given in Fig.2 for realistic levels of thermal noise
on the channel, where for each pair of channel parameters
the post-selection is numerically optimised over. Encour-
agingly we see that noise on the order of 1% results in
only a modest reduction of the keyrate.
Conclusions.—
In conclusion we have shown that post-selection based
CVQKD is secure for arbitrary collective attacks, and
thus asymptotically secure for all attacks. This was
achieved by identifying an entanglement based scheme
that correctly reflects the post-selected ensemble that is
used in the final key generation. Furthermore these re-
sults show little loss of performance compared to previous
analyses of post-selection and are quite robust to mod-
est amounts of excess noise on the channel. There are
several avenues for further work, foremost being the fact
that the bounds given here are certainly not tight. Other
topics of interest would be the incorporation of finite-size
effects and the combination of post-selection with other
protocols to identify the optimal technique for a given
scenario.
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